Quality standards are rapidly gaining importance as a result of increasingly globalized trade. Rich country quality requirements are said to have detrimental effects on poor producers in developing countries because they would introduce new trade barriers, prevent small and poor producers from participating in high quality supply chains, and allow multinationals to extract rents. We analyze under which conditions the introduction of quality standards in global value chains may benefit poor producers in developing countries, taking explicitly into account key characteristics of these value chains. We investigate the effects of competition and development and discuss a series of policy implications.
Introduction
Recent technological developments and globalization are transforming the industrial organization and international location of production.
1 One of the most important mechanisms underlying the globalization process lies in the transfer of advanced production capabilities to low-wage economies. These capabilities comprise both an increase in productivity and in product quality (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985) . Sutton (2001) argues that the quality aspect is by far the more important element: poor productivity can be offset by low wage rates, but until firms attain some threshold level of quality, they cannot achieve any sales in global markets, however low the local wage level.
However, the introduction and spread of quality standards by rich countries have ignited a vigorous debate in the development community with respect to their effects on poor producers in developing countries, and are argued to further weaken claims on the beneficial effects of trade liberalization for poverty reduction.
2 Some have argued that the imposed standards are reinforcing global inequality and poverty as (a) they are introducing new (non-tariff) trade barriers, (b) they are excluding small, poorly informed, and weakly capitalized producers from participating in high quality supply systems, and (c) large and often multinational companies are extracting all the surplus through their bargaining power within the chains (Augier et al., 2005; Brenton and Manchin, 2002; Reardon and Berdegué, 2002; Unnevehr, 2000; Warning and Key, 2002) .
This debate has been especially active in the context of global supply chains of agricultural and food products, for several reasons (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Reardon et al., 1999) . On the one hand, agriculture in developing countries, and exports of agricultural commodities, are seen as a very important potential source of pro-poor growth (World Bank, 2007) . On the other hand, rich country food safety and quality standards, both from private and public sources, have tightened dramatically over the past decade, strongly affecting 1 One issue that has attracted much attention is outsourcing (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2002; . Another issue, more closely related to our paper is the role of vertical integration in the globalization process. A series of models have studied under which conditions two firms will vertically integrate, either backward or forward, and how this affects the incentives to invest or innovate (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Aghion et al., 2006) . Some papers study the impact of weak enforcement institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Macchiavello 2006 ). 2 There is still debate on the impact of trade (liberalization) and the integration of developing countries in global trade on economic growth (Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Irwin and Tervio, 2002; Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001) . There is even less consensus about the impact of trade on poverty. In a survey of the evidence, Winters et al. (2004:106) conclude that "there can be no simple general conclusion about the relationship between trade liberalization and poverty". international trade and global value chains in these commodities (Jaffee and Henson 2005) . 3 However, there is considerable uncertainty with respect to the validity of the above-mentioned arguments, and more generally the welfare implications of high-standards trade. First, it is argued that while quality and safety standards indeed make production more costly, at the same time they reduce transaction costs in trade (Henson and Jaffee, 2007) . Despite the strong increase in the number and stringency of standards there has not only been a significant growth in exports from developing countries to rich countries, but the share of highquality (high-value) exports has grown disproportionally. While traditional exports from developing countries increased by 50% between 1985 and 2005, high-value exports increased fivefold over the same period. They now represent over 40% of all developing country agrifood exports. Even for Africa, the growth numbers are staggering: exports of fruits and vegetables have increased nine-fold over the past 50 years, and the most spectacular growth has occurred over the past two decades -the period when standards have increased most .
Second, recent empirical studies show that smallholder participation in high quality global supply chains is much more widespread than initially argued (Reardon et al., 2009). 4 There is much less evidence on the third critique, which is the rent distribution within these supply chains. Empirically, most studies have focused on the exclusion issue and very few studies actually measure welfare, income or poverty. The few studies that do measure welfare effects find positive effects for poor households in developing countries who may participate either as smallholder producers or through wage employment on larger farming companies 3 The number of technical (sanitary and phytosanitary) measures notified to the GATT or WTO has increased dramatically over the past three decades (Henson, 2004) . All these concern "public standards". At the same time, private companies, often multinational processing or retailing companies have imposed additional "private standards" on their suppliers and the marketing chains. These private standards are often even more demanding as the public standards (Fulponi, 2007) . 4 Some studies indicated that small farmers are excluded because of increasing food standards Key and Runsten, 1999; Gibbon, 2003; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; Kherralah, 2000) . For example, evidence from Kenya, Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire suggests that horticulture exports are increasingly grown on large industrial estate farms, thereby excluding smallholder suppliers in the export supply chain (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Minot and Ngigi, 2004) . Others find very different effects. For example, Minten et al. (2009) show that in Madagascar most fresh fruit and vegetable production for exports is on very small farms, often on a contract-basis with the agrifood industry, and with important positive effects on farmers' productivity. Similar results are found by studies in Asia (Gulati et al., 2006) , in Eastern Europe (Dries and Swinnen, 2004) , and in China (Wang et al., 2009) . (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Maertens et al., 2011) . What is remarkable is that strong benefits occur in several of these cases despite the fact that trade is organized by monopsonistic exporting companies.
This paper seeks to identify the conditions under which poor producers can benefit from the introduction of quality standards in response to rich consumers' demand, taking into account key characteristics of the supply chains between rich consumers and poor producers. 5 We discuss how the process of development changes these conditions and effects and what this implies for policy.
One key characteristic is that the introduction of higher quality requirements has coincided with the growth of contracting and technology transfer. There is extensive empirical evidence that contracts for quality production with local suppliers in developing and emerging countries not only specify conditions for delivery and production processes but also include the provision of inputs, credit, technology, management advice etc. (see e.g. various case studies in Reardon et al., 2009; Swinnen, 2006; 2007; World Bank, 2005; Gereffi et al., 2005) . The latter are particularly important for local suppliers who face important local factor market imperfections -another key characteristic. In particular imperfections in credit and technology markets are typically large, which implies major constraints to investments required for quality upgrading, especially for local firms and households who cannot source from international capital markets. However, the enforcement of contracts for quality production is difficult in developing countries which are often characterized by poorly functioning enforcement institutions -a third important characteristic. These enforcement problems can add significantly to the cost of contracting and may prevent actual contracting to take place. 6 We use a conceptual framework which explicitly takes into account that vertical coordination and technology transfer can emerge as a spontaneous response to on the one hand the demand for high quality products and on the other hand suppliers' factor market constraints. First, we explain that the absence of 5 Our analysis is related to research on FDI spillovers which suggests that foreign companies are more likely to engage in vertical integration and vertical coordination (Aghion et al., 2006) , and on the distribution of rents within companies, domestically (Blanchflower et al., 1996) and internationally (Borjas and Ramey, 1995; Budd et al., 2005) . The analysis also relates to a large body of research on interlinking markets (Bardhan, 1989; Bell, 1988) , on opportunism and enforcement in contracts and credit markets (Powell, 1990; Genicot and Ray, 2006; Gow and Swinnen, 2001; Mookherjee and Ray, 2002) . 6 There is an extensive literature on the role of formal and informal enforcement institutions in development, e.g. North (1990) , Platteau (2000) , Greif (2006 ), Fafchamps (2004 , Dhillon and Rigolini (2006), etc. socially efficient contracting is more likely with higher enforcement costs and higher requirements for specific inputs in high value production.
Second, we explain how local suppliers in developing countries can benefit importantly from integration in global supply chains. The distribution of the gains from contracting depend on the overall rent that can be created by the contract and on the enforcement costs. If third party enforcement (formal or informal) is very costly, buyers may prefer to make the contract self-enforcing by means of an additional money transfer to the supplier, which we call an "efficiency premium". The size of the efficiency premium depends on the supplier's ex post outside options and on the cost of enforcement.
7 Because of this efficiency premium, weak contract enforcement may under some conditions increase the supplier's income.
Third, we explain why "development", i.e. an exogenous improvement of factor markets and enforcement institutions, may have some non-intuitive effects on both equity and efficiency, and may hurt some of the contracting parties under some conditions. The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a conceptual framework. Section 3 explores the option of third-party enforcement of contracts, and Section 4 and 5 assess the impact of respectively competition and development on efficiency and equity within the contract. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the conclusions and discusses the policy implications.
Quality and rent distribution in value chains
Consider the general case where a local household or company in a developing country -which we refer to as "the supplier" -can produce high-quality products and sell them to a trader or a retailing or processing company -which we refer to as "the buyer". This buyer can sell the product (possibly after processing) to consumers -either domestically or internationally. To produce a high-quality product, the supplier needs to use a certain amount of inputs, such as labor. The supplier's opportunity cost for these inputs depends on his best alternative which may be to produce a low-value product for the local market. The production of high-value commodities typically requires extra capital, for example to buy specific inputs (e.g. fertilizers, feed, seeds), and technology. When the supplier does not have access to such capital because of credit market imperfections, these capital constraints hurt both suppliers and buyers: they prevent suppliers from producing for the high-quality market and constrain access 7 Note that we define "ex ante" and "ex post" as before and after conclusion of the contract respectively. 8 A formal analysis of the arguments in this section is presented in Appendix.
to raw materials for the processing firm. If the buyer has access to the required capital and technology -e.g. because he has better collateral, a higher cash flow, or lower transport or transaction costs -he can offer a contract to the supplier, which includes the provision of inputs and technology on credit and the conditions (time, amount and price) for purchasing the supplier's product.
9 This is a realistic case since the buyer may have better collateral or more cash flow or face lower transport or transaction costs in accessing the inputs. In this way, the introduction of higher quality requirements can induce the growth of contracting with improved access to inputs and technology transfer to suppliers (see e.g. Javorcik, 2004; Jaffee, 1994) .
There is extensive empirical evidence that supplier contracts for quality production in developing and emerging countries often include the provision of inputs, credit, technology, and management advice. For example, Dries et al. (2009) document how, in the course of transition, dairy processors in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have been providing not only feed and management advice but also loans and bank loan guarantees to their suppliers for investment in cooling equipment and improved livestock. Such contracts induced significant growth in farm investment and quality improvements, including for smaller producers (Dries and Swinnen, 2004; . Swinnen et al. (2007) show how small cotton producers in Kazakhstan receive credit, water (through irrigation facilities) and fertilizers from cotton gins. Minten et al. (2009) and Bellemare (2012) show how high-value vegetable contracting implied extension services, management advice, the provision of pesticides, and the introduction of organic fertilizers for thousands of poor farmers in Madagascar. The induced technology transfer caused improved soil fertility and major productivity growth for vegetables and staple crops.
Contract enforcement
Under perfect enforcement, both agents have incentives to implement the contract and honor it if surplus can be created. The respective incomes of the supplier and the buyer depend on their opportunity costs and their bargaining power. However, when contracts are legally unenforceable -as is the case in many developing countries -opportunistic behavior may lead to hold-up if one of the agents has an attractive alternative to contract compliance (cfr. Williamson, 1981) .
There are several possible hold-ups in the value chain under study. The full decision-making process is summarized in Figure 1 . First, the supplier can divert the received inputs to other uses, such as selling them or applying them to other production activities (e.g. low quality products for the local market). If the supplier violates a contract, he suffers a reputation cost. Second, the supplier may use the inputs, as agreed in the contract, but then sells the high-quality output to an alternative buyer. Such "side-selling" can be profitable as the alternative buyer does not need to account for the cost of the provided inputs. However, the competing buyer may not value the product as much as the contract buyer who outlined the production process from the start according to his specific needs. By side-selling, the supplier's payoff equals the price offered by competing buyers (henceforth "spot market price") minus the reputation costs. This price reflects the degree of buyer-specificity of the production standards (the higher the specificity of the product or the quality standards, or the higher the transaction costs of switching, the lower the spot market price is). If competing buyers value highquality products only as much as low-quality products, or when there is no local market (yet) for the high-quality product, the spot market price will be rather low. For the supplier to voluntarily comply with the contract, his income from the contract must cover his disagreement payoff (hence, his participation constraint must be satisfied), and be at least as much as his outside options, obtained from breaching the contract through input diversion or sideselling, i.e. his incentive compatibility constraints must be satisfied.
Note that the contract is feasible only if it also satisfies the buyer's participation constraint. This implies that his opportunity cost of capital must be covered by his share of the gross contract surplus. This requires a certain minimum value (surplus) in the chain. If sthere is sufficient surplus, it is possible to adjust the contract terms such that the buyer's participation constraint and the supplier's participation and incentive compatibility constraints are simultaneously satisfied.
Efficiency premiums
The buyer can pay the supplier a premium on top of the perfect enforcement outcome to ensure the supplier's incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied. The resulting contract is then self-enforcing. This is equivalent to the concept of "efficiency wages" (Salop, 1979) , where the employer pays a higher wage to his employees to minimize their incentive to quit and seek a job elsewhere, after having trained them. We therefore refer to the difference between the supplier's payoff under (costless) perfect enforcement and under costly enforcement as an "efficiency premium."
Making the contract self-enforcing by paying an efficiency premium is a rational strategy for the buyer, as it can earn him a better payoff than his outcome when being held up, or upon contract breakdown.
10 It follows that the higher the supplier's payoff is of using the specific inputs for other purposes, or the higher the price is that opportunistic buyers offer for the supplier's produce, the higher this efficiency premium must be. A higher reputation cost from breaching the contract reduces the required efficiency premium. Hence, as long as the contract is enforceable, the supplier's income will be increasing in his ex ante as well as his ex post outside options.
There is substantial evidence that processors and retailers offer their suppliers an "efficiency premium" in environments with weak contract enforcement to induce their suppliers to produce and deliver according to the contract terms. This is done in a variety of ways. The most straightforward way is when processors and retailers effectively pay an extra premium (von Braun, 1989) . Larsen (2002) shows that in the cotton sector in Zimbabwe incentive premiums are awarded to loyal farmers by the main cotton gins, while defaulting farmers are effectively penalized. Strohm and Hoeffler (2006) and Rao and Qaim (2010) find that for several products, including vegetable production for supermarkets, contract farmers in Kenya receive above-opportunity cost prices. Birthal et al. (2005) and Singh (2002) find that farmers benefit from higher prices (e.g. in the production of milk and vegetables) and higher incomes with contracts in India.
Another example of an efficiency premium is where buyers offer suppliers additional inputs as fertilizers and pesticides for their own food crops to avoid input diversion. For example, Govereh et al. (1999) find that contracting schemes in Kenya and Mozambique allowed participating households to use provided inputs (such as fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides and machine services) on food crops. Yet another incentive is the provision of prompt cash payments to farmers in environments characterized by payments delays and high inflation. Various studies emphasize the key role played by prompt payments in contracting in transition countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s when delayed payments were considered a major obstacle to business development (see e.g. Gow et al., 2000; Gorton et al., 2000; Gorton and White, 2003; Van Herck et al., 2012) .
Contract failure and breach
However, contracts will only be enforceable under certain conditions. The most straightforward reason for contract failure is when the gross contract surplus is insufficient to simultaneously cover the buyer's and the supplier's participation constraints. In this case the net surplus of the transaction will be negative, and there is no incentive for contract formation. The more interesting case for our analysis is when the gross contract surplus is sufficient to cover both agents' participation constraints, but fails to cover the supplier's incentive compatibility constraints concomitantly. In this case, there is no price the buyer can offer the supplier in order to make him comply with the contract. In other words, the premium that the buyer has to pay the supplier not to breach the contract is larger than the buyer's gross revenues: he cannot afford this. Under these conditions, the contract will not be realized, even if it would be socially efficient to do so.
So far, we have focused on supplier contract breach. However, obviously buyers can breach contracts as well, e.g. by renegotiating a contract ex post. The reputation loss which he suffers depends on whether high-quality supplies are scarce, or not. If the buyer's reputation cost is low, and if the supplier's option of input diversion dominates the option of side-selling, the buyer can gain by renegotiating the contract at the time of product delivery.
In summary, contracting is less likely to be feasible (a) if the value in the chain is low, (b) if there are more alternative sales outlets for inputs and/or highquality products, and (c) if reputation costs are low. Note that in a world of perfect foresight contract breach would never occur. If either the buyer or the supplier realizes that the incentive structure is such that the other agent will breach the contract, such contracts will not be concluded in the first place. Hence, such contracts can, by definition, not be observed. However, in a world of imperfect information (which includes the occurrence of unexpected events) contract breach does occur.
The existing literature offers ample empirical support. For example, Poulton (1998) describes how diversion of inputs supplied for cotton production to other uses is a general phenomenon in Ghana. Farmers divert both fertilizer and pesticides, either by using them on food crops or by selling them to other farmers or traders. Ruotsi (2003) finds that companies in horticultural production in Kenya and Zambia have been subject to vigorous side-selling. In particular, horticultural exporters have lost between 20% and 40% of their contracted production to their competitors and many closed down their credit provision programs because of these losses. Similarly, Wangwe and Lwakatare (2004) and Jaffee (1994) document how African breweries experienced strong opportunistic behavior by suppliers in contracting for malting barley. Contract breach occurred in various ways. Many farmers used part of the fertilizer, advanced by breweries for contracted barley, on fields which were not under contract. Some found it more profitable to sell their barley to other buyers. Many also concealed a portion of the barley harvest for family subsistence. The involved companies lacked the personnel to enforce the contract and accepted this "peasant pilferage" to some extent as an unavoidable cost of business. Yet at some point, losses from diversion grew too large: the breweries ceased to advance fertilizer to the farmers under contract.
Similarly, Grosh (1994) and Stringfellow (1996) document the collapse of contract farming schemes in Kenya and Zambia because opportunistic smallholders were avoiding repayment of their loans through sale of output to a buyer other than the one who provided the inputs. The scheme operators stopped supplying seasonal credit (in cash or in kind) and the end result was that many farmers no longer had access to inputs or working capital.
There is also evidence that contract feasibility depends on the nature and value of the commodity. Govereh et al. (1999) conclude that, unlike perishable and industrially processed high-value cash crops, opportunistic behavior is more likely to occur in staple food crops which can be stored on the farm for longer periods and for which it is easier to find alternative buyers. Conning (2000) describes how in Chile, credit provision programs from traders in traditional small farmer crops like wheat, maize and beans have been given up, because of the numerous alternative marketing channels for these crops and the concomitant frequency of opportunistic sales by suppliers.
Endogenous monitoring and third party enforcement
Alternatively, contracts can be enforced by investing in monitoring, or by engaging a third party for contract enforcement, if it is not prohibitively costly. Monitoring and third party enforcement can have important effects both on surplus creation and its distribution. Enforcement through monitoring or third party enforcement comes at a cost, e.g. the cost of hiring lawyers or paying the local mafia to enforce the contract, or wages of local staff to monitor contract compliance. As an illustration of the extent, the importance, and potential costs of monitoring in these high-quality chains, consider the following quote from Minten et al. (2009 Minten et al. ( : 1733 on monitoring in high value vegetable production in Madagascar:
"To monitor the correct implementation of the supplier contracts, the [processor] has … around 300 extension agents who are permanently on the payroll … Every extension agent, the chef de culture, is responsible for about 30 farmers. To supervise these, (s)he coordinates five or six extension assistants … that live in the village itself. … During the cultivation period of the vegetables under contract, the contractor is visited on average more than once … a week ... to ensure correct production management as well as to avoid "side-selling." … 99% of the farmers say that the firm knows the exact location of the plot; 92% of the farmers say that the firm will even know … the number of plants that are on the plot. For some crucial aspects of the vegetable production process, representatives of the company will even intervene in the production management to ensure it is rightly done."
It is profitable for the buyer to invest in monitoring or third party enforcement if it is cheaper than the efficiency premium he would have to pay the supplier to ensure contract compliance. This may have important income effects, which will be mostly positive for the buyer and negative for the supplier. First, if contracting is feasible with an efficiency premium, monitoring or third party enforcement will reduce the supplier's income since the buyer no longer pays an efficiency premium. Second, if the value (maximum surplus) in the chain is too low to have feasible contracts without third party enforcement, the buyer's income will increase with monitoring or third party enforcement. However, if all bargaining power lies with the buyer, the supplier's payoff will only equal his opportunity cost of labor, as the buyer claims the entire contract surplus.
The effects discussed here are direct effects. The supplier may still benefit indirectly, in case third party enforcement leads to an increased demand for his products ex ante, and hence an increased opportunity cost of labor.
Competition
The traditional argument is that competition between buyers has a positive impact on suppliers: it increases demand for their products and, if the different buyers do not collude, competition will drive up the suppliers' price (Inderst and Mazzarotto, 2008) . However, if one takes into account the specific characteristics of high-value chains in developing countries, it is clear that the impact of competition will be more complex.
11 First, the introduction of competition between private buyers will increase the ex ante outside option suppliers face at the time of contract negotiation. Indeed, not only the non-contract outcome, in which they continue to produce for subsistence remains an option, but they can also go to another buyer to see which contract terms he would offer. This raises the supplier's share of the gross contract value.
Second, the buyer's incentives for better management, cost reduction and innovation will be stronger in a competitive environment. This increases the gross value of the contract.
However, competition will not only affect the demand for output, but also the provision of inputs.
12 With (increased) competition between buyers, input provision may be unsustainable, and contracting may break down although it would be socially efficient. Increased competition may increase ex post outside options of the supplier through a higher number of opportunistic buyers. With more buyers, it will be harder to behave monopsonistically, or to collude or coordinate among buyers. Moreover, more buyers may imply a wider diversity of buyers, including buyers who potentially have a higher valuation of the highquality product. In addition, competition between buyers will reduce the supplier's reputation cost from breach of contract. One reason is that the number of agents operating in the market may negatively affect the penalty for contract breach (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998) , because the threat of cut-off from future contract arrangements is less stringent, as there are other contract partners available. This argument is in line with Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) , who state that reputation is an effective weapon against moral hazard only for suppliers "of those factors that are in excess supply". In other words, a higher demand for the supplier's produce lowers his reputation cost from contract violation. A second reason why the penalty for breaching a contract is lower with more competition, is that reputation effects are less prevalent in a competitive market, where buyers are less likely to coordinate and share information (see e.g. Zanardi, 2004) . Moreover, local information networks work less well when the number of agents expands, as it costs more in terms of effort, money, and/or time to let information spread among a larger group of buyers. This will make it easier for an opportunistic supplier to find an alternative buyer.
All these competition effects will benefit suppliers, as long as buyers are still willing to contract. As long as contracts remain feasible, competition will induce an increase in efficiency (through the removal of inefficiencies) as well as in supplier income, due to an improvement in the suppliers' ex ante as well as ex post outside options. However, as the supplier's minimum required income for contract compliance grows with competition, at some point it might no longer be possible to simultaneously satisfy the applicable participation and incentive compatibility constraints. In this case, competition will undermine contract feasibility and may hurt both contracting agents.
13
The liberalization of cotton sectors in various countries in the past two decades provides interesting empirical insights into the impact of increased competition -generally consistent with the arguments made above. Sadler et al. (2007) show how liberalization in several Central Asian countries caused strong growth in output as farmers benefited from enhanced prices and interlinked contracts from ginners, providing them with fertilizer, seeds and irrigation. However, Poulton et al. (2004) document how, as competition for seed cotton intensified in liberalized cotton markets in Africa, side-selling became much more widespread, causing the existing cotton gins to stop offering credit and pesticides to producers. Along the same lines, Brambilla and Porto (2006) find that increased competition induced significant side-selling in Zambia in the 1990s as cotton gins that were not using outgrower schemes started offering higher prices for cotton to farmers who had already signed contracts with other firms as outgrower. This caused repayment problems and increased the rate of loan defaults. 14 13 Only in the case where renegotiation by the buyer cannot be ruled out, and contracts break down because input diversion is a more attractive option than side-selling, competition has an additional positive (partial) effect on contract feasibility by exerting an upward pressure on the buyer's reputation costs and/or the spot market price for the high-quality product. This is in line with the argument made earlier by Klein et al. (1978) , stating that competition between buyers may reduce the supplier's susceptibility to a hold up by the buyer, and as such improve investment incentives. 14 There are additional effects, making the aggregate competition effect even more complex. With increased incomes from competition, suppliers may be able to acquire inputs and increased incomes from technology directly -either because of their reduced capital constraints or because of induced growth of input markets -reducing the need for contracting. Finally, the effects of competition are conditional on the possibility for third party enforcement. Indeed, if the buyer uses third party enforcement, the impact of competition will be limited to the impact of an increased ex
Development
Development is a broad concept and is both cause and consequence of the formation of interlinked contracts. Here we consider in particular changes in two factors which coincide with development: the improvement of (public) enforcement of contracts and the improvement of the functioning of factor markets. 15 If enforcement becomes less costly with the emergence and better functioning of formal institutions, this will affect the emergence and distributional effects of contracts. Second, if factor markets develop, producers' access to specific inputs and technology will become less constrained, and this will obviously also affect contractual arrangements. To identify the precise mechanisms, we discuss these effects separately.
Improvement of contract enforcement institutions
It is generally observed that formal enforcement institutions become more effective with development (Djankov et al., 2003; North, 1990) . In our framework, this implies that third party enforcement becomes less costly. An obvious implication is that for lower levels of the efficiency premium, third party enforcement will be preferred to efficiency premium payments.
This has implications for contract formation as well as for rent distribution. First, a reduction in the cost of third party enforcement extends the value range where contracts are enforceable. Second, if third party enforcement was already the cheapest option for contract enforcement, third party enforcement now becomes even cheaper. This increases the contract surplus, with a positive impact on efficiency. However, thirdly, as the cost of third party enforcement decreases, it will substitute for efficiency premium payments and lead to an income loss for the supplier. In conclusion, improved enforcement institutions may benefit both parties, but, under some conditions, only the buyer will gain, and the supplier will lose, as cheaper third party enforcement will deprive the latter from his efficiency premium, and as such reduce his income (see also Anderson and Young, 2002) .
Factor market development
ante outside option. Note however that, as competition tends to raise the required efficiency premium, it will also make third party enforcement more attractive relative to self-enforcement. 15 Apart from factor markets, also output markets may develop. If output market development improves suppliers' access to profitable opportunities outside of the contract, the required efficiency premium, and hence also their income will improve as long as contracting remains feasible.
The development of factor markets is expected to relax credit constraints and to improve access to input markets. On the one hand, this may provide suppliers with better access to profitable opportunities outside of the contract, and hence a higher opportunity cost of labor. On the other hand, buyers may no longer need to give inputs on credit. Pure output contracts become feasible. With pure output contracts, the buyer-supplier interaction will change into a standard specific investment setting à la Klein et al. (1978) . Buyers no longer need to give efficiency premiums to make suppliers comply with the contract. This will increase contract feasibility by reducing inefficient separation.
Hence, improving factor markets may or may not benefit the supplier. It may benefit the supplier directly if his opportunity cost of labor is positively affected, or indirectly if inefficient separation prevented contracting before. However, it will reduce the supplier's income if contracting was feasible before. As a result, the share of total income accruing to the supplier may be lower in a pure output contract than in an interlinked contract.
Cases from Eastern Europe suggest that, indeed, when rural factor markets developed in response to various institutional and economic reforms, the provision of inputs disappeared as part of contracts and with it the efficiency premiums (World Bank, 2005) . In the course of market and institutional development, the quality of independent farm production and the availability of supplies to buyers improved. As a result, buyers, such as food retail companies, gained leverage to increase price pressure on farmers in their supply contracts. The nature of the contracts evolved accordingly and the main benefits from contracting for farmers shifted frominput provision to the guarantee of sales and payment conditions.
Summary
In conclusion, development is likely to enhance efficiency (surplus creation), but the distributional impacts are less obvious. Both parties may benefit from development, primarily through a reduction in the incidence of contract breakdown. However, it is possible that some aspects of development will reduce contract feasibility (i.e. the increase in suppliers' ex ante and ex post opportunity costs). Moreover, even if development enhances contracting and high-quality production, cheaper third party enforcement and enhanced access to inputs may reduce efficiency premium payments, and as such the supplier's income.
Conclusions and policy implications
Technological development and globalization are transforming the industrial organization and international location of production. This has induced a transfer of advanced production capabilities to low-wage economies, with the imposition of rich country quality standards on poor country producers -and the rapid growth of high value trade. This process has triggered a vigorous debate in the development community with respect to its effects on poor producers in developing countries, and generated further criticism on the beneficial effects of trade liberalization for poverty reduction.
In this context, it is typically argued that large and multinational firms, who are often the drivers behind global value chains, are extracting all surplus in the chains. However, recent empirical studies have challenged this, providing evidence of substantial benefits for poor producers. In this paper we provide an explanation why, if quality matters and contract enforcement is not perfect, poor producers, such as smallholder farmers in developing countries, may benefit importantly from inclusion in these chains.
Benefits come through a combination of factors: (a) the (relatively) high potential surplus created in high-quality supply chains; (b) the endogenous technology transfer in the chains; (c) vertical coordination put in place to overcome smallholders' constrained access to inputs; and (d) the need to pay local producers an efficiency premium in the presence of weak contract enforcement mechanisms. As we discussed in this paper, the interaction of these factors can create important income effects for poor producers. If quality requirements create the need for specific input use, buyers have an incentive to upgrade their suppliers' technology level and reduce their production constraints. This creates various holdup opportunities for suppliers, and as such, buyers need to offer attractive contract terms in order to secure their returns to investment. Hence, poor suppliers can benefit from the introduction of quality standards in a weak contract enforcement context, even when they face major constraints in terms of access to technology, inputs and knowledge, and if all bargaining power lies with the buyer.
However, the fact that poor producers may benefit does not mean that there are no substantial challenges for developing countries and in particular for the most resource-constrained households to participate and benefit. A first general policy implication is the recognition of the potentially important antipoverty effects and the inherent technology transfer to poor countries that may result from the growth of these high-value supply chains and, therefore, the need to explicitly integrate them into development policy and strategies. In preparing such a policy strategy it is important to take into account that there is significant variation in the organizational models in these value chains, in response to differences in rich country consumer preferences (including public and private standards), product characteristics, local factor market imperfections, contract enforcement institutions, etc. Policies should be sufficiently general and/or flexible to accommodate for such differences and to adapt to changing circumstances.
A variety of policy initiatives, institutional innovations and economic reforms may be needed to encourage investment -domestic as well as foreignin processing and trade of high(er) quality products. Macro-economic stability is important for stimulating investment and for vertical coordination and technology transfer. In addition, policies should allow for vertical coordination between buyers and their suppliers (for example, in India, several states do still not allow contract farming; other states have amended their legal acts only recently). Public investment in (rural) infrastructure is important to reduce the cost of sourcing supplies from remote areas -where the poorest households live -or to remove key obstacles for quality production. Examples of such investments are roads, electricity (e.g. if cooling of the product is required for quality), irrigation infrastructure, as well as investments in extension services and vocational education to assist and prepare local producers for producing higher quality products.
Another important policy issue relates to institutions for quality control (including the required equipment and infrastructure such as testing labs) and for contract dispute settlement. There are obvious incentive problems in controls being implemented by one of the two agents -most often the buyer. Hence the development of third party quality control systems or institutions in which both suppliers and buyers are represented is important. Producer cooperatives could play an important role here. Such cooperatives could also play a role in dispute settlement.
Our analysis also suggests that both competition and development may have non-linear effects on efficiency and equity in global value chains. While improvement of enforcement institutions and factor markets enhances high quality production, it may paradoxically hurt some of the local suppliers if they no longer benefit from efficiency premium payments. Similarly, while competition between buyers is likely to benefit suppliers in various ways, under some conditions it may have a detrimental effect on vertical coordination, causing suppliers to revert back to low-value production. That said, it is important to realize that, in reality, at least in early stages of market development, high value chains are likely to create competition rather than reduce it. In developing countries, the emergence of modern value chains may increase (or create) competition for the established traders and middlemen, who often have a monopoly position vis-a-vis local producers.
Finally, in the existing literature, most attention has gone to the developmental effects of high-value chains on small producers, which is where our arguments have focused on as well. However, another way of organizing production when contract enforcement is costly is to fully vertically integrate (merging buyer and supplier). Vertical integration is most likely to occur with high enforcement costs in contracting. With some exceptions (see Collier, 2008) , the development community has generally dismissed this as a negative scenario, in particular for agricultural and rural development, emphasizing the importance of smallholder participation for poverty reduction. However, recent empirical evidence on the impact of high quality chains through vertical integration and large production units suggest that such models may also have strong anti-poverty results through labor market effects. Moreover, they suggest that these benefits may be particularly important for the poorest households (Maertens et al., 2011) and for women who are disproportionately employed in these chains . While substantially more research is required to study how general these conclusions are, such direct and indirect employment effects should be seriously taken into consideration. This final argument fits into our general policy proposal for a more pragmatic and evidence-based view on development strategies regarding these new global value chains.
Appendix: A model of quality and rent distribution in global value chains
A supplier sells a product to a buyer; who can sell it to consumers at a unit price p h . 16 To produce a high-value product, the supplier needs to invest an amount of labour l, at an opportunity cost Y l = l , and capital k for specific inputs. 17 The 16 Our model assumes that rich consumers, within a country or abroad, create a demand for high quality goods. Companies providing these quality goods may transcend the Bertrand Paradox and thus make profits, for a variety of reasons. One reason is that quality is a multidimensional concept, laden with personal preferences and subjective judgments. This allows firms to differentiate their high-quality products from other firms' products. Product differentiation is one way to relax price competition (Tirole, 1988) . Another reason why price competition may be less vigorous for companies focusing on high-quality products, is that the latter often requires a lot of specific know-how, and investments in human capital. This gives rise to barriers to entry. Other reasons for the existence of barriers to entry, are for example existing economies of scale in complying with international standards, as at least part of the adjustments to be made are fixed costs (Henson and Jaffee, 2007) . Finally, the crucial importance of reputation in doing international business often creates a substantial barrier to entry, which makes some successful exporters the "gate-keepers" to attractive markets abroad, with substantial market power. 17 Our specification is similar to Kranton and Swamy (2008) 's model of transactions between exporters and local producers in Colonial India. In these transactions, exporters provide capital, while producers provide labor. However, as contract enforcement institutions are assumed to be weak, contracts need to be made self-enforcing.
supplier does not have access to inputs, and the buyer offers an interlinked contract to the supplier, which includes the provision of inputs on credit. The buyer's opportunity cost of capital is Π l = k . We assume an indivisible production function and a fixed proportions production technology. The net value of the contract is θ = p h -l -k . The contract terms are determined as in a simple principle-agent model, in which the buyer extracts the entire surplus. 18 Under perfect enforcement of contracts, the respective incomes are Y pf = l for the supplier and Π pf = p h -l for the buyer. However, when opportunistic behavior is possible, incomes will be different. The different payoffs are shown in Figure 1 . 
